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1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of giftedness has been much debated in recent years.  Some use the term ‘gifted’  
as a kind of synonym for ‘genius’, referring to a phenomenon that is relatively rare.  Others  
use  it  more  liberally,  finding  gifted  individuals  in  substantial  numbers  throughout  the 
population.  An initial difficulty, then, is the concept’s range of application; this difficulty is 
indicated by the title of philosopher Ruth Jonathan’s article: ‘The notion of giftedness – or, 
“how long is a piece of string?”’.   A second difficulty is emotional and/or political.  Many  
feel, with P. O. Rogne, that the term ‘gifted’ implies “receiving something for nothing, and it  
is difficult to garner sympathy for someone so apparently blessed” (quoted by George, 1997,  
p. 3). Even if gifted individuals are a) reliably identifiable and b) needy as well as blessed,  
justice seems to demand that scarce resources go to the less fortunately endowed.  A third 
difficulty is cultural.  It is said that the term ‘gifted’ is applied to individuals who perform 
highly in  socially valued  ways.   This  is  reflected  in  the  Western  bias  towards academic 
achievement, and neglect of survival-skills like hunting for food.  In this respect the concept  
of giftedness is seen to be arbitrary, an expression of parochial values.  A fourth difficulty 
attaches to a worrying social phenomenon: that of parents who are narcissistically invested in  
the success of their children.  A child may present as gifted, i.e.  as a very high achiever,  
though  she  is  not  ‘naturally’  this  way at  all.   She  is  no  more  than  a  product  of  pushy 
parenting,  having been trained to perform in certain ways.   Such children are sometimes  
called trophy-children1, and we are generally concerned about their fate.   
One response to these concerns is to sharpen the definition of giftedness, and many 
attempts have been made to do this.  However little is achieved if, as is typical, the definition  
1 See www.wordspy.com/words, where ‘trophy child’ is defined by Paul McFedries (2002):  “A child 
used to impress other people and enhance the status of the parent or parents.”
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is  disjunctive  and  unresponsive  to  common  concerns.   The  well-known  Marland  Report 
(1972), for example, offers six criteria for giftedness (‘general intellectual ability,  specific 
academic aptitude, creative or productive thinking, leadership ability,  visual or performing 
arts,  psychomotor  ability’),  without  explaining  why  they  should  be  grouped  together  or  
indeed why we need a concept of this kind at all.  One is left with the impression, as John  
White says (1970), that giftedness is a “purely artificially constructed concept”.
In  this  paper  I  shall  address  some  of  the  scepticism surrounding  the  concept  of  
giftedness, and outline what I see as a viable concept.  If successful, this concept will help us  
to identify children as ‘gifted’, not in a way that is cut-and-dried, but in a way that is useful.  
It  will  also,  hopefully,  advance the question of  whether gifted individuals  should receive 
special educational provision.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the matter of  
provision in detail, but it seems reasonable to expect that a concept of giftedness should have  
a bearing on this issue.  This is especially the case insofar as the focus of interest is, as here,  
children rather than adults.  The point is not merely to classify individuals; it is to address the 
question which is implicit in the sceptical position: why bother?  It matters little whether you 
and I disagree about  whether Clinton was a gifted politician,  but  our disagreement  about 
whether a particular child is gifted may affect the school she goes to, the after-school club she 
attends, the mentor she may or may not have.  Our concern about giftedness in children is  
inseparable from our concern about them as developing individuals.
All this raises the question of potential.  It is fashionable when discussing giftedness  
(by contrast with I.Q.) to point out that one is concerned with potential as well as actual 
ability.  The Marland report, for example, discusses not only “demonstrated achievement” in 
any of the six areas but also “potential ability” in any of these.  Of course most adults are  
capable of learning, and many have not realised their potential, but the issue of potential is 
more acute with children than with adults given the rapid development that typically takes 
place during childhood.  The concern about giftedness is largely a concern about missing this 
window of opportunity,  and there can be little doubt  that  the opportunity  is often missed 
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through ignorance or neglect of children’s potentials2.  My defence of a concept of giftedness 
in this paper is motivated by a desire to set this matter straight.
2.  THE CONCEPT OF NATURAL ABILITY
Gifted children go by many names.  They are the highly or exceptionally able, the genius 
children, the super-bright.  So long as the terms of the discussion are clear, it hardly matters  
which terms we use.  Giftedness will do as well as any other.
My aim is to clarify an ordinary, serviceable concept of giftedness that accords with  
the  non-sceptical  intuitions  of  people  who raise  and work  with children.   Ruth  Jonathan 
(1988,  p.  117)  is  surely right  when she says:  ‘The  common-sense observation that  some 
individuals seem “brighter” than others is basic to an interest in giftedness.’  This, I believe, is  
a good place to start.  A gifted child is more than usually bright, at least in some area or other. 
Sometimes the area of brightness is specific: the child is exceptionally good at maths, say, but  
little else.  Sometimes she is bright ‘across the board’.  
If this is correct, we have already strayed some distance from the National Academy 
for Gifted and Talented Youth (2002, p. 5) definition, which identifies gifted children in a 
two-tiered way3 as “the top 1% or the top 5% of pupils… in terms of their academic ability”.4 
Quantitative definitions of giftedness are currently favoured by the UK government, though it 
2  On this point Israel Scheffler writes (1986, p. 203): “The capacity to learn is not an unlimited 
resource which can be lightly squandered.”
3 While it can be useful sometimes to distinguish between ‘gifted’ and ‘exceptionally gifted’, I believe 
that the alleged statistical basis is misleading.  These issues are discussed later in the paper. 
4  This definition is linked to a distinction between giftedness and talent which I shall not follow. 
According to this definition, gifted students have high academic ability, whereas talented students have 
ability in “creative arts or sports”.   This definition does not accord with ordinary usage, for we 
normally call exceptional young violinists (for example) gifted and talented interchangeably.  It is true 
that ‘talent’ tends to have a creative implication (a ‘talented child’ is likely to be musical, artistic etc.), 
but the idea that academic excellence is non-creative is misleading.  
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is far from clear how potential as opposed to actual ability is to be measured.  At the very  
least there seems to be substantial scope for error, and since differentiated provision is at  
stake, also scope for injustice.  The problem with quantitative definitions is that the size of the 
target  group is  determined  in advance.   One says:  in  this  class  I  shall  pick  out  two (or  
whatever 5% of the class number is) children as ‘gifted’: no more, no less.  This idea corrupts  
what  I  am calling the ordinary,  serviceable concept,  which views giftedness as a kind of  
property of children in relatively non-comparative ways5.  Of course it may be said: we only 
have enough resources to give enriched or accelerated educational support to two children in 
every  forty.   But  this  assumes  that  enriched  or  accelerated  educational  support  will  be 
beneficial for two children in every forty.  This is a large assumption.  
Jonathan’s  common-sense  observation  that  some  individuals  seem ‘brighter’  than 
others  leads  in  a  different,  and  I  believe  more  promising,  direction.   The  concept  of  
brightness, and particularly the concept of unusual or super-brightness, has an underpinning 
that is both problematic and, I would suggest, undeniable.  This is the idea of naturalness or 
innateness.  To say that one person is much brighter than another implies (in a way that is  
hard to pin down but also hard to deny) that they were born, or are naturally, that way.  This is 
problematic  because  it  recalls  the  erroneous  idea  that  intelligence  (I.Q.)  is  an  innate,  
measurable property of individuals that is immune to environmental influence.  It has been 
amply pointed out that this idea is nonsensical because there is no way of extrapolating from 
the  environmental  influence  to  isolate  (or  indeed  measure)  a  purely genetic  endowment.  
From the fact that one cannot do this it does not follow, however, that one can never detect a  
genetic or innate  influence.  The following, by a well-known sceptic in this area, is surely 
true:
There is no denying that from an early age young people do differ in their patterns  
of ability.  One child does well at arithmetic but appears incapable of learning to  
play  a  musical  instrument.   Another  youngster  is  hopeless  at  both  music  and  
arithmetic but has a flair for new languages.  Even within the same family there  
may be striking differences  between siblings: one daughter takes to the task  of  
5 There is a comparative dimension to the concept of giftedness, but my point is that this is poorly 
served by statistics.  This issue is discussed more fully in Section Four. 
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learning to play the piano with apparent ease, while her older sister struggles to  
master a few elementary pieces.
In this passage Michael Howe (1999, pp. 189 – 90) seems to acknowledge what I am calling 
natural brightness.  In everyday life we use terms like ‘flair’ and ‘strength’ to refer to this in  
particular  areas of learning, and it  is a small  step from here to the recognition that some 
people have many strengths, or remarkable strengths, and are therefore super-bright, or gifted.  
To the radical sceptic who claims that there must be an environmental explanation for such 
differences, we can only say that this appears to be contradicted by the facts.
One of the main sources of unease about the concept of giftedness is expressed in my 
fourth objection above: the ‘pushy parent’ objection.  This says that the ‘label’ of giftedness is 
likely  to  reinforce  parental  delusions,  for  natural  and  parentally-contrived  giftedness  are 
indistinguishable.   This  is  wholly  false.   Natural  and  parentally-contrived  giftedness  are 
indeed distinguishable, but only given a frank acknowledgement of the concept of natural  
brightness.  They are distinguishable as any other empirical differences are distinguishable; 
by careful observation of the facts of the case, particularly the ways in which parents do or do 
not exercise an influence over their children.
The point of saying that some children are naturally brighter than other children is 
not, as some fear, to give the brighter ones accolades or to reinforce unhealthy divisions.  It is 
to identify and respond to children’s  potentials  appropriately,  particularly when these are 
masked by social inequalities.  A naturally bright child may be passed over as such because  
her performance is unexceptional.  Her performance may be unexceptional because she was 
never read bed-time stories and didn’t  hold a crayon until  she was five.   This child may 
benefit from being identified as unusually bright (using criteria to be discussed in Section 
Four);  this  will  enable  her  teachers  to  address  the  gap  between  her  actual  and  potential  
performance.  She must be distinguished from the child whose performance is, let us say,  
exceptional  simply because she has  been  intensely pressured  and coached.   The latter  is  
vulnerable  to  various  sorts  of  unhappiness  insofar  as  she  is  viewed  as  unusually bright, 
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whereas the former may be vulnerable to unhappiness insofar as she is not seen this way.  It is 
because this  difference is  so  important  that  we  need to  accept,  with Ruth  Jonathan,  that  
observations about (natural) brightness are “basic to interest in giftedness”.
Natural  ability and environment  are of course deeply intertwined.   Since learning  
begins at birth there is little  prospect  of quantitatively disentangling these at  a later  date.  
What  is  being  suggested  here  however  is  that  there  are  occasions  on  which  natural  and 
environmental  influences  can  and  should  be  evaluated (as  distinct  from  measured) 
independently.  We may observe that a child has natural ability that is neglected or dormant 
because  her  environment  is  non-propitious;  or  that  a  child  who  has  little  natural  ability 
performs extremely well, having been under great pressure to succeed.  This difference points 
towards the following fourfold distinction: 
1) the child who is very bright, and benefits from propitious environment;
2) the child who is very bright, but lacks a propitious environment;
3) the trophy-child, who achieves highly as a result of a pressured environment, 
but  who  seems  ‘not  bright’  or  only  ‘moderately  bright’,  and  strained  or 
alienated by the experience;
4) the child who seems ‘not bright’, and lacks a propitious environment.
I  am not  suggesting that  all  children fall  into one of these groups.   Both brightness  and 
propitious  environments  are  less  than black-and-white  affairs,  and  a  great  many children 
undoubtedly  belong  to  more  than  one  group,  or  shift  between  groups.   The  groups  are 
conceptual, primarily: they mark out distinctions which I am arguing educators must be free  
to use.
Without these distinctions we are not free to raise the questions: 
• Is this child seriously under-achieving?  Is a non-propitious environment masking the 
child’s considerable natural ability?
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• Is  this  child  seriously  over-achieving?   Does  her  success  in  exams  mask  a 
manipulative adult who is pushing the child inappropriately?  
It is important that educators are able to raise these questions, and generally try to 
understand interactions between children’s natural abilities and the environments in which 
they find themselves.  We sometimes need to ask, to put it crudely, what children are made of, 
if  we are to understand their  struggles and help them.   The failure to do this,  indeed the 
resistance to doing this, can be detrimental to children generally,  and to gifted children in 
particular. 
3. GIFTEDNESS AS AN EDUCATIONAL DIFFERENCE
Though the literature on the concept  of  giftedness is  large,  there is  next  to  nothing of a  
balanced or analytical nature on this topic.  Gifted children, so-called, have their advocates 
and their detractors.  The advocates call for recognition and provision; the detractors express a 
range of responses, from a downright sneer (“the mummies and daddies think the little sprot 
is a genius” (T.E.S. website 2002)) to a more reasoned scepticism and egalitarianism.  On 
both  sides,  there  appears  to  be  a  prior  commitment:  to  addressing  the  alleged  needs  of 
particular  children,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  a  fair  and  rational  concept  of  educational  
difference, on the other.  Both commitments, moreover, seem well supported by arguments.  
Some children, say the advocates, need a kind of provision that a homogeneous educational 
system cannot provide.  They need this not because they are struggling to learn, but because 
they learn too easily, too quickly or too well.  The detractors point out that such children have 
an advantage, and that they do not form a clearly identifiable group.  It should be possible,  
they say,  to  relieve  debilitating  boredom in  a  homogeneous  system by providing  special 
challenges for unusually bright children.  All children are different and should be treated as  
individuals.   Rather than siphon off  the so-called gifted into special institutions, the right  
response is to address ability-differences as effectively as possible.
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The result is a stand-off, the educational context of which is well-described by Alan 
Dyson (2001, p. 25) in this passage:
[There is] a fundamental contradiction within the education systems in the UK and  
the USA (and,  we might guess, elsewhere in the liberal democracies) between an  
intention to  treat  all  learners  as essentially the same and an equal  and opposite  
intention to  treat  them as  different.   All  learners  are  the  same in their  essential  
human characteristics, in the rights and entitlements which are ascribed to them and  
in their participation within some more-or-less loosely defined process of education.  
At  a  practical  level,  therefore,  we  seek  to  educate  them within common schools,  
through  a  common  curriculum  and  by  means  of  broadly  common  pedagogical  
strategies.  All learners are different, however, insofar as they are individuals with  
distinctive  learning  styles,  needs  and  interests.   We  seek  to  respond  to  these  
differences by placing them in different teaching groups, offering them variations on  
the common curriculum, developing individual teaching programmes and so on.  
Working within this contradiction creates a series of dilemmas for education  
professionals and policy-makers.  Put simply, the more their educational responses  
emphasise  what  learners  have  in  common,  the  more  they  tend  to  overlook  what  
separates them, and the more they emphasise what separates and distinguishes each  
individual learner, the more they tend to overlook what learners have in common.
We need to explore this contradiction and its  attendant  policy difficulties.   Something  is  
seriously amiss if we cannot keep a conceptual handle on both commonness and difference.  
It  is my view that giftedness detraction, accepted by many as a politically correct stance,  
reflects precisely this difficulty.   The difference between bright and not-so-bright children 
slots unobtrusively into the concept of mixed ability teaching.  Problems set in with children 
who appear so bright that the questions arise: is this child uneducable within a mixed ability 
context?  Is she so different from other children that it is wildly unrealistic to expect her to 
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benefit  from  a  mixed  ability  environment?   These  questions  worry  at  the  concept  of 
educational difference, and with them come some serious difficulties.
In the paper referred to earlier, Ruth Jonathan (1989) argues that giftedness is not an 
educationally useful difference.  This is not to say, she writes, that “there are no differences in  
capacity or attributes between children, nor am I suggesting that a homogeneous education 
should ignore such differences” (pp. 123 - 4).  Rather:
I am simply denying that there are two groups of children – ‘the gifted’ and (by  
implication) the non-gifted mass of the population.  There is no separate group which 
we can categorise even in principle, in order to specially cater for their individual  
differences.   Such  differences  do  indeed  exist,  but  not  between  two  groups  of  
children,  rather  amongst  all  children.   This  implies  not  two  programmes  of  
educational  provision,  but  one  general  programme  sensitively  adjusted  to  the  
individual differences of each child.
What is Jonathan saying in this passage?  A general point to consider is that the concepts of  
sameness  (or similarity)  and difference rest  on a further  concept  of  a  respect (or  several 
respects) in which two or more items (people, things, situations, ideas) are compared.  Two 
items may be similar in one respect and different in another; whether we call them similar or  
different depends on our interests and purposes.  If the concept of giftedness is to be useful  
educationally, we need to identify a respect (or several respects) in which gifted children are  
usefully seen as  a ‘separate  group’,  i.e.  as similar  to  each other and different  from other  
children.
The  ordinary,  serviceable  concept  of  giftedness  should  reliably  pick  out  some 
children sometimes, and there needs to be a point in its doing so. To this extent, there must be 
a  ‘separate  group’,  a  group  that  we  can  ‘categorise  in  principle’.    Let’s  consider  two 
relatively straightforward examples: Ruth Lawrence and Gary Kasparov at, say, age twelve.  
It would be hard to grasp the motive of someone who wanted to withhold the description 
‘gifted’  from  such  children,  given  their  remarkable  and  apparently  natural  aptitudes  for 
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mathematics and chess respectively.  If, however, someone was sceptical, one might point to 
an  obvious  respect  in  which  these  children  are  reasonably  ‘grouped’  together,  and 
distinguished from most other children.  Neither was easily accommodated at school – at least 
when it came to maths and chess.  Lawrence would have been wasting her time in the KS3 
maths lessons, and Kasparov would have been wasting his time in the school chess club.  At  
least this is presumably the case unless special provision was made. 
So something along the lines of ‘not fitting in well with most same age children (at  
least in certain subject areas), because of unusual mastery or ease of learning’ might be the 
beginnings of a respect in which gifted children are different from other children and similar 
to each other.  There are several ways in which this suggestion might be rebutted.  First it 
might be said that if gifted children (so-called) don’t fit in with other children, all the more 
reason  for  ignoring  their  gifts  (so-called),  and  encouraging  them  to  see  themselves  as 
ordinary.  (Something like this thought underlies the disparaging notion of the ‘hothouse’.) 
Second,  it  might  be  said  (as  Jonathan  says)  that  we  need  to  recognise  all individual 
differences, and provide sensitively for these.  Third, it might be said that the Lawrences and 
Kasparovs are vanishingly rare, and irrelevant when it comes to public policy.  It might be  
conceded that they are different, and the question raised, so what?  Problems set in when 
every Tom, Dick and Harry is described (as often as not by his parents) as gifted, on the 
strength (at best) of what is more accurately described as brightness.   
I shall consider these objections in turn.
1)  Children should be encouraged to see themselves as ordinary.  This suggestion 
springs from what Dyson calls the educational response that emphasises “what learners have  
in common”.  It may be perfectly reasonable as rule-of-thumb, and indeed if a child is being  
beguiled by her parents into believing that she is superior to other children, this injunction 
will be appropriate.  It does not follow from this that it is always appropriate.  On the contrary 
the injunction may be used to put pressure on a child to conform – a kind of psychological 
denial - in which case it may be positively harmful.
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2) We need to recognise all individual differences.  In other words, what all learners 
have in common is that they are different.  In a sense this cannot be denied, but it is a fairly  
vacuous statement, and the problem with Ruth Jonathan’s idea of one programme “sensitively 
adjusted to the individual differences of each child” is that it sounds idealistic and impractical. 
3)  The category of gifted children is either vanishingly small or hopelessly ragged. 
This,  as  I  see  it,  is  the  key objection.   If  there were typically a couple of Lawrences or  
Kasparovs in every classroom, the suggestion that they should be encouraged to blend in or  
that  they are  only different  in  a  sense  that  applies  to  all,  would  sound rather  lame.   If,  
alternatively,  there  were  typically  no  Lawrences  or  Kasparovs  in  a  classroom,  but  some 
children  who  resembled  them  in  some  educationally  significant  respect,  we  might  also 
dismiss these suggestions.  I believe that the latter may be the case.  Gifted children may be 
rare but not vanishingly so, and reasonably seen to constitute a ‘group’ even though not all  
members of the group are paradigmatic cases.
Objection 3) needs to be answered; we need to identify our target group.  This is the  
challenge I now want to address.  
4. WHO IS GIFTED?
Dyson identifies two opposing educational tendencies.  One emphasises “what learners have 
in  common”,  and the other  emphasises  “what  separates  and distinguishes each individual 
learner”.   As implied by the term ’emphasis’, one tends to predominate over the other.  But 
both are important, so what should we do?
It will be useful to explore Ruth Jonathan’s argument further in order to get to grips  
with this problem.  Her emphasis is on commonality, and her idea of sensitively adjusting to 
the  individual  needs  of  each  child  sounds  a  bit  like  an  afterthought.   The  emphasis  on 
commonality is  betrayed  at  several  points,  but  most  clearly when she reveals  that  she is  
exploring “stumbling blocks” or “obstacles” to what she calls a “valid understanding of which 
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individuals possess the inherent capacity which is likely to lead to future high achievement.”  
Though not spelt out as such, the structure of her argument goes something like this:
1) Ethically and politically, all children should be seen  as  ‘the  same’.   They  should 
have equal entitlements and so on.  
2) The idea of giftedness implies that some children are entitled to a better  or  more 
stimulating education than others.
3) 1) is a cherished ideal.  Therefore we should presume that  2)  is  wrong  unless we 
discover solid grounds for distinguishing  and  giving  preferential  treatment  to  so-
called gifted children.
4) An example of a solid ground would be evidence of an inherent  capacity  possessed 
by some, but not all, which is likely to lead to future high achievement. 
5) There are many “stumbling blocks” and “obstacles” (logical  and  empirical)  in 
the way of providing such evidence.
6) Therefore 2) is wrong.
There are numerous flaws in this argument, and I shall not try to disentangle them 
here.  In particular the move from 3) to 4) is flawed, because it imports assumptions about the 
notion of a ‘solid ground’.  Jonathan is reacting strongly in her paper against psychometric  
conceptions of intelligence, as well as against the idea that precocity is a reliable indicator of  
future  high  achievement.   This  is  sound,  but  the  emphasis  on  equality and commonality 
squeezes out considerations of difference.  Claim 2) is doomed from the start; it is as though 
gifted children (so-called) are guilty unless proved innocent, i.e. a spurious group unless their 
separate  existence  can  be  established.   The  tools  by  which  this  might  be  achieved  are  
precisely those which Jonathan rejects.  For gifted children to earn the status of a ‘separate  
group’ educationally, they would have to demonstrate their existence psychometrically, and 
also demonstrate plausible connections between their psychometric (current) identities and 
future high achievement.  By these exacting standards, it is no wonder that they fail.
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The reason why there seems to be so little common ground between advocates and 
detractors is  that  the questions  one asks  depend heavily on one’s  initial  emphasis.   Ruth  
Jonathan the detractor asks: which individuals possess inherent capacities that are likely to 
lead  to  future  high  achievements?   This  is  a  national  interest  question,  and  it  is  not  an 
unreasonable one, except that the answer is almost  certainly:  we don’t know.  This fairly 
predictable answer means that the question can be raised without endangering our familiar  
egalitarian concerns.  We do not know who the future high achievers are likely to be, so we  
had better treat children as the same.  I have nothing but respect for the egalitarian concern, 
but there is another question that needs to be asked, that many teachers and parents do ask, 
and this is not a national interest question at all.  It is what one might call an individual need 
question, and it asks: what should we do about those individuals who do not fit in well with  
their peers educationally for reasons that seem linked to their unusual brightness?  This sort of  
question is often dismissed on the grounds that the educational needs of such children are 
doubtless exaggerated.  But this is too easy.  Without empirical evidence, we cannot know 
that they are not needy.  
Jonathan neglects an important  possibility:  that  a  legitimate  concept  of  giftedness 
would be associated with the needs and entitlements of individuals.  It seems obvious enough 
that  Ruth  Lawrence’s  needs  would  have  been  neglected  if  she  had  been  stuck  with 
mathematics at Key Stage 3.  Not only this: her entitlement to an education in mathematics 
would have been neglected.   The concept  of entitlement is  more straightforward than the 
concept of need.  The entitlement to education is clearly not fulfilled by trying to teach a child 
something she mastered some years ago.  Whether children need to be properly educated is 
another  matter,  but  it  seems  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  boredom  and  frustration 
characteristic of many gifted children are evidence of need.
The challenge, we recall, is to discover respects in which giftedness is usefully seen 
as a ‘difference’.  We need criteria, in other words, for the application of this concept, and  
these must address at least some of the concerns that were discussed in the introduction.  The 
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concept of giftedness must be neither too broad nor too narrow: the ‘group’ of gifted children  
should not be raggedly large or vanishingly small. Giftedness must not be statistically related 
to  performance,  as  per  the  government  of  this  country.   I  have  made  several  further 
suggestions.   I  discussed  the  young  Lawrence  and  Kasparov,  two  exceptionally  high 
achievers, and suggested that such children are paradigmatic.  I also suggested that ‘not fitting 
in well educationally with most same age children by virtue of unusual mastery or ease of 
learning’ was a step in the right  direction.   I  suggested,  finally,  that  an understanding of  
giftedness  might  be  expected  to  issue  from the  emphasis  on  difference,  rather  than  the 
emphasis on similarity.  The emphasis on difference would highlight the non-fulfilment of  
certain children’s needs and entitlements.
Against this background I now want to propose some criteria for giftedness.  The first  
and primary criterion is exceptionally high achievement in at least one significant area of  
learning.  (I shall presently discuss the cultural objection, mentioned earlier on, to the concept  
of an ‘area of learning’.)  Exceptionally high achievers do not typically fit in well with same  
age children in terms of their educational needs and entitlements.  For example a common 
though not invariable corollary of exceptionally high achievement is an exceptional desire to 
achieve.  This can give rise to needs: gifted children are often obsessional about acquiring 
knowledge and/or skills in a particular area.  Further, exceptionally high achievers tend to 
exhibit mastery in areas where others are struggling, and we have seen that this can conflict  
with their entitlement to learn.  
However the concept of exceptionality is not straightforward, and its susceptibility to 
different interpretations lies behind the charge of ‘raggedness’.  A child who is exceptional in 
one context may be unexceptional in another, where the standards are generally higher.  We 
also  have  the  concept  of  being exceptional  ‘by any standards’:  the  young  Lawrence and 
Kasparov clearly fell into this group.  What this indicates is a need to distinguish relative from 
absolute giftedness.   (The government  distinction between top 5% giftedness and top 1% 
giftedness is surely a misguided way of trying to do this).  The relative sense is ‘weaker’ than  
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the absolute sense, but this does not mean that it is not useful, given that the point (as I am 
arguing) of using the concept in the first place is to address children’s needs and entitlements.  
Like Marge Simpson’s sky blue hair that seems to disappear on cloudless days, giftedness  
may ‘dissolve’, i.e. cease to be an issue, when a child moves to a school that is more suited to  
her abilities.  Far from invalidating the concept, this situation should be applauded since it  
means that the child’s needs and entitlements are now being met.  
Jonathan’s  sub-title  ‘how long is  a  piece of  string?’  suggests  that  the  concept  of 
giftedness is invalid because it lies on a slippery slope.  This is rather like saying that the 
question ‘at what age may a child be reasonably left alone at home?’ is meaningless because  
it lies on a slippery slope.  However, this is not so.  It is an awkward question, certainly, but 
its meaningfulness is guaranteed by the fact that it  sometimes yields robust answers.  Most 
would agree that a two year old child should not, but a fourteen year old child may, be left 
alone at home for periods of time.  In between is a grey area which we may need to negotiate 
by reference to individual  children.   Equally,  as I  suggested at  the outset,  some children  
clearly are gifted, and others clearly are not, whereas for many children in between, it is a 
matter of judgement and circumstance.  Different children become ‘foregrounded’ as gifted in 
different schools and communities, and this is as it should be.  
A child who habitually performs exceptionally well, either ‘by any standards’ or by 
the standards of a particular community,  fulfils what I would call the primary criterion of 
giftedness.  Note that this criterion overlaps with what I earlier called the ‘beginnings of a  
respect’ in which gifted children should be seen as ‘different’, i.e. that they do not fit in well  
with most same age children (at least in certain subject areas), because of unusual mastery or  
ease of learning.  We now see how ‘most same age children’ can refer to those in a particular 
community or to same age children generally.  
In addition to this primary criterion, I suggest that there are two ‘loose’ criteria or 
‘indicators’ of giftedness, i.e. indicators of the potential ability to perform exceptionally well.  
The first is exceptional or remarkable insight, shown in unsystematic ways.  For example a 
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generally low-achiever betrays, through a remark here or there, an extraordinary capacity to 
grasp certain concepts or ideas.  She has flashes of extraordinary insight,  say,  though her  
concentration and output  are  poor.   This  sort  of  profile  –  occasional  brilliance,  unsteady 
concentration or performance – points to a worrying discrepancy between potential and actual  
ability which could have a social or emotional source.  This is the sort of case that rightly 
arouses the concern about wasted potential that is central to the issue of giftedness.
The second indicator of giftedness is a passion for learning.  We have all come across 
children who are education-junkies, preferring to spend their free time at museums or with 
their heads in books than playing with their friends.  It is not impossible to have a passion for 
learning without the ability to achieve highly, but there is obviously a strong psychological 
connection between these.  As Christopher Winch (1990, p. 37) writes:
Excellence… will thrive on a strong degree of interest and commitment.  Interest in  
an activity will lead to more practice, more knowledge, and greater understanding.  So 
will a strong desire to do well.
Even  if  the  education-junkie  is  not  getting  the  highest  grades,  teachers  should  be  on 
‘giftedness alert’ for this individual.  They should be on the look-out, that is, for boredom,  
rapid learning and high (if erratic) achievement, as well as for possible counter-indications, 
like a parent that the child is eager to please by this kind of behaviour.  In the absence of the  
latter, it seems to me that lovers of learning should generally be grouped with gifted children 
in  the  primary,  performative  sense,  whether  or  not  they  too  are  achieving  exceptionally 
highly.  To do so may mean giving them opportunities to do precisely what they (and we as  
educators) want them do to, namely devote themselves wholeheartedly to learning6.  
The concept of giftedness, I suggest, belongs to the area I have outlined.  The primary 
criterion for giftedness is absolute and relative exceptionally high achievement, but giftedness 
6  This is not to deny that the wholehearted devotion to learning can be excessive.  It would be wrong, 
however, to assume that it is excessive without establishing ways in which it is genuinely harmful to 
the child.  My impression is that this assumption is frequently made.  
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is also indicated in the absence of such achievement, first, by unsystematic, unusual insight, 
and second, by an unusual passion for learning.  As I said earlier on, the primary criterion and 
an unusual passion for learning often co-exist.  People who excel in a certain activity typically  
(though not invariably) love engaging in it, and are highly motivated to learn.  Rawls cites  
what he calls the Aristotelian Principle, which says that: 
other things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realised capacities  
(their  innate  or  trained  abilities),  and  this  enjoyment  increases  the  more  the  
capacity is realised, or the greater its complexity.7
My only reservation about this principle is that it is under-stated.  The term ‘enjoy’ does not 
capture the single-mindedness with which gifted individuals often pursue their interests.  This 
is important because it is when a desire becomes not merely strong but overwhelming that we 
are tempted to say that it gives rise to needs.  There is a sense in which heroin addicts do not  
need heroin, but also a sense in which they do, and the realisation of abilities (whether innate 
or trained, or more likely a combination of the two) may be associated (unlike a need for  
heroin) with positive, life-enhancing needs.  
The passion for learning is an important and neglected aspect of giftedness.  This is  
not to say that all gifted individuals are highly motivated to develop their gifts, but there is a 
sense in which, as implied by Rawls’ Aristotelian Principle, a lack of motivation to develop a  
rare  or  remarkable  gift  is  a  puzzling,  or  disturbing,  phenomenon.   Sometimes  it  is 
understandable.  There are many people with musical gifts who, for temperamental reasons,  
cannot bear the drudgery that is required on a daily basis to master a musical instrument.  I 
have never known such a case in which there was not profound regret and ambivalence about  
the neglect of such a gift, and it seems to me that teachers should do all they can to help  
children (where help is needed) to take pleasure in their gifts.  
7  Rawls, John (1971), p. 426
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I now want to consider a profile of a fourteen year-old boy who illustrates my point  
about indicators of giftedness.  He seems, I suggest, like a gifted individual, despite being a 
‘walking disaster’ at school:
Martin is considered to be a 'walking disaster' by his teachers. He seems to  
live in a world of his own. He is never where he should be and is invariably late for  
classes... His handwriting is appalling, and he is reluctant to put pen to paper. He  
has a very sharp wit and has become the class clown. He was quite interested in  
secondary school in the first two years, when he enjoyed the wide range of subjects.  
Last year things began to go wrong for him. He found teachers to be more concerned  
with maintaining their authority than with the pursuit of truth. He found the move to  
set syllabuses very frustrating because there were fewer opportunities for 'theorising'  
and 'playing' with ideas.
His  relationships  with  teachers  are  extremely  poor,  since  he  tends  to  
challenge and question both their authority and their knowledge. He is also rather  
dismissive  of  the  views  of  his  peers.  His  science  teachers,  however,  value  his  
contribution  to  class  discussion,  since  he  shows  remarkable  insight  and  
understanding, beyond that of most young people of his age. He would like to devote  
himself  exclusively to science, and science-related subjects,  and dispense with the  
rest. He should be capable of achieving good examination results, were his present  
attitude and ability  to  present  his  work to  change...  One is  tempted to  ask  what  
Martin gets out of school!    (David George, 1992, p. 25):
This is  a short  profile,  but I think that most  people would agree that Martin is at least a 
candidate  for  giftedness.   It  seems  likely,  for  example,  that  he  could  benefit  from  a 
programme for gifted young scientists.  How one might balance his claim to be admitted on to  
such a programme against the claim of a high but unmotivated scientific achiever, I have no 
idea.  What does seem obvious is that the definition of giftedness as the “top 1% or the top 
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5% of pupils… in terms of academic ability” does not remotely address this question.  If we 
are serious about responding to children’s needs and entitlements, we must set aside statistics 
and try to balance the claims of individual children.
Martin is a candidate for giftedness because he has enthusiasm and insight in an area 
that  we value socially.   Ruth Jonathan articulates the cultural  objection when she writes: 
“What gifts or talents are selected for attention will be relative to the goals and values of the  
selecting  group.”   Giftedness,  it  is  implied,  is  an  arbitrary  concept.   We  reward  gifted 
scientists and musicians but not gifted hairdressers,  skate-boarders or players  of computer 
games.  This is discriminatory, unfair.  
This objection is common, but I confess I find it perplexing.  I earlier dismissed the 
idea of responding to concerns about giftedness with a definition (the problem is who we pick 
out as gifted, and for what purposes; towards these ends definitions are often less than useful),  
but the following definition of giftedness responds frankly to the ‘arbitrariness’ objection in a  
way that surely cannot be bettered:
Gifted young children are those who have the capacity to learn at a pace and level  
of complexity that is significantly advanced of their age peers in any domain or  
domains that are valued in and promoted by their sociocultural group.8
The expression ‘capacity to learn’ is unhelpful, since many gifted individuals have learning 
difficulties,  but  the  interest  of  this  definition  is  its  reference  to  socioculturally  valued 
domains.  If one feels uneasy about this, the unease should be directed towards education  
generally,  which is imbued with value judgements because it aims to prepare children for 
adult life within particular societies.  As Christopher Winch writes:
…education is intrinsic to any society, since any society that has ever existed  
or will ever exist has to prepare the young for adult life.  Education is a practice as  
ancient as the human race.  This means that it carries with it an enormous cultural  
tradition which runs back to the roots of any society.9 
8 Porter, Louise (1999), p. 33
9 Winch, Christopher (1996), p. 34
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It is against this background that we reward and encourage some gifts rather than others.  This  
is not to deny that elitism and prejudice exist and should be challenged; nor is it to deny that  
we should acknowledge more ways in which children can be gifted than we tend to at present.  
It is to say that elitism and prejudice are not, as is often assumed, inevitable corollaries of the  
concept of giftedness.  
6. CONCLUSION
I have argued that it is educationally useful to regard gifted children as a ‘group’.  Contrary to  
what many detractors say, I suggested that there are criteria by which they can be reasonably 
identified,  and that  they are likely to have unmet  needs and entitlements  for a  cluster  of 
reasons, unless special provision is made.  For my money, this justifies the concept.  To say 
that gifted children constitute a group is not to say that they have nothing in common with 
other  children;  nor  is  it  to  say  that  they  are  better.   It  is  to  say  that,  with  important  
qualifications, they may and often should be seen as ‘different’.  That they have the potential 
for future high achievement is not a point that I have stressed here.  Such potential is clearly 
present, but it is also present in other children: gifted children do not have a monopoly on  
future achievement.  Having said this, it seems obvious that, given their unusual capacities 
and passions, achievement is often something that gifted children need if they are to lead 
fulfilling lives.  I mean achievement, not for trophies, but for its own sake, and at a relatively 
high level.  This being so, there is clearly a national interest argument in favour of the view I  
am proposing; but without prior consideration of need and entitlement, the national interest 
argument flounders on concerns about coercion.
I have said little about the varieties of gifts that individuals may have in this paper.  In 
the spirit  of Howard Gardner, many have been quick to point out significant  differences  
between  children  who  are  gifted  artistically,  mathematically,  linguistically,  musically,  
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ethically, physically (at sport), and so on and so forth.  I believe that these differences exist  
within the terrain that I have demarcated.  Whether a child is a gifted footballer, chess-player,  
musician or cartoonist, insofar as we undertake to provide an education in any of these areas, 
we must undertake to respond to needs and entitlements as discussed here.  Chess champions 
need something  other  than  after–school  chess;  without  this,  they  are  likely to  be  bored,  
impatient,  frustrated.    Mathematical  prodigies are  entitled to  an education in maths,  and 
should not be expected to spend years treading water.  
If  gifted  children  constitute  a  separate  ‘group’,  should  we  put  them  in  separate 
institutions?  The answer is, not necessarily, though the desirability of flexible arrangements  
is implied by my argument.  Just as there are arguments in favour of separate institutions, so 
there are arguments against.  The latter refer to those emotional and social considerations that 
the giftedness detractors are at pains to point out.   All that is implied by my argument is that  
these considerations are not the whole story: that gifted children as a group are liable to have  
particular  needs  and  entitlements.   From here  the  question  is  not:  do  they  need  special 
institutions?  It is: how (in special institutions or otherwise) can we meet these needs and  
entitlements?
That the detractors’ argument is seriously imbalanced has been the main thrust of this 
paper.  In the extraordinary penultimate paragraph of her paper, Ruth Jonathan betrays the 
extent of this imbalance in her argument: 
If  favourable  development  results  largely  from  favourable  stimulation,  and  if  
education  is  the  attempt  to  provide  favourable  stimulation  in  order  to  produce  
favourable development, then questions of which individuals this stimulation should  
be offered to are disguised proposals about which children should be educated.  
This is alarming.  Jonathan seems to think that raising questions about provision for gifted 
children  threatens  provision  for  other  children.   The  question,  as  she  sees  it,  is:  which  
individuals should be favourably stimulated?  This is the same question (she rightly says) as: 
which children should be educated?   But whoever said that ‘which individuals should be  
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favourably  stimulated?’  was  the  question?   The  concern  around  giftedness  is  that  some 
children may need greater stimulation than is normally provided at their age, but ‘greater’ is 
not the same as ‘more favourable’.  ‘Greater’ may mean more advanced, more intense, more  
challenging.  If a child is an education-junkie,  why should she not  receive this,  and why  
should other children be seen to be missing out? 
The idea that if gifted children are properly educated, other children will lose out,  
places  a  heavy burden on the gifted ones.   We need to  relieve children of  burdens,  and  
responding to  their  passions for  learning as  discussed earlier  is  an important  step in  this 
direction.   In  the  light  of  this  conclusion,  it  seems  appropriate  to  give  the  last  word  to  
psychologist Joan Freeman (2001, p. 193):
The big question which pounded through my head...was why so many of these bright  
eager children had needed to struggle so hard to even partly realise their gifts. It was  
not only unfair on them but a wicked waste of everyone's energy... Far too much of  
their energy went into fighting the establishment, supposedly there to help them, or  
dissipated into wrong channels because of poor guidance...
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